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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











MICHELE RICCI; ADMINISTRATOR NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON;  
DONALD MEE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTARTOR AT NEW JERSEY STATE 
PRISION IS BEING SUED IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; 
WILLIAM MOLEINS, CAPTAIN AND ACTING DIRECTOR OF CUSTODY  
AT NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON IS BEING SUED IN HIS  
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY;CLAY MCCLAIN,  
SERGEANT AT NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON  
IS BEING SUED IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-08-cv-05764) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mary L. Cooper 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 15, 2014 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges  
 












 Sharob Abdul-Aziz, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the 
District Court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a).  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
summarily affirm.
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I. 
 Sharob Abdul-Aziz, a New Jersey prisoner, filed an amended complaint pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as defendants various officials and employees of the New 
Jersey State Prison (“NJSP”).  The complaint alleged that Muslim inmates were 
prevented from practicing their religion, and that Abdul-Aziz was retaliated against for 
trying to rectify the unfair treatment.  The alleged retaliation involved a nine-day 
assignment to temporary close custody (“TCC”) and transfer to an institutional job that 
was much lower-paying than his previous position.  According to Abdul-Aziz, these 
actions violated his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment.  He asked 
for monetary and injunctive relief.   
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 We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may 
summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a substantial 
issue.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We may affirm on any basis supported by the 
record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  Because 
Abdul-Aziz is proceeding in forma pauperis, we must dismiss the appeal if it is frivolous.  
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 
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 The District Court dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) Abdul-
Aziz’s claims that his job reassignment violated his rights under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and that his time in the TCC violated his rights under the 
Due Process Clause and Eighth Amendment, and denied his request for injunctive relief 
regarding the return of his musical instruments and electronic equipment.  The District 
Court also denied Abdul-Aziz’s motion to certify a class of Muslim inmates at NJSP.2  
Following discovery, Abdul-Aziz and the defendants made cross-motions for summary 
judgment, which the District Court denied with respect to Abdul-Aziz and granted in part 
and denied in part with respect to the defendants, leaving one claim viable.  Counsel was 
appointed to represent Abdul-Aziz, and after additional discovery, the defendants again 
moved for summary judgment.  The District Court granted the defendants’ motion, and 
Abdul-Aziz timely appealed.   
II. 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Dismissal is appropriate where the pleader 
has not alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 
                                              
2
 We agree with the District Court’s reasons for denying these motions and will not 
address them further.   
We review such an action for abuse of discretion, Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 
263, 268 (3d Cir. 2009), and discern no error in the District Court’s denial of Abdul-
Aziz’s motions for a preliminary injunction.  The motion requested relief that was 
duplicative of that requested by the complaint.  Because Abdul-Aziz’s complaint was not 
supported by adequate evidence, he is not entitled to the relief requested.   
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plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations 
omitted).   
Upon review, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Abdul-
Aziz’s claim that conditions during his time in TCC violated his rights under the Eighth 
Amendment.  To establish that one’s conditions of confinement violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, a plaintiff must show he was 
denied “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.”  Betts v. New Castle Youth 
Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010).  Although Abdul-Aziz alleged that he was 
not given a change of clothing, he did not claim that he was forced to go without clothing 
or that his fundamental needs were not being met.  This Court held, in Gibson v. Lynch, 
652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981), that an inmate’s incarceration for 90 days in solitary 
confinement due to prison overcrowding did not violate the Eighth Amendment where his 
basic needs for nutrition and shelter were being met.  Id. at 350, 352.  As Abdul-Aziz was 
in TCC for only nine days, dismissal for failure to state a claim was appropriate.   
Furthermore, we agree with the District Court that Abdul-Aziz failed to state a 
claim for violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment following 
his transfer to TCC.  It is well-settled that placement in administrative confinement will 
generally not create a liberty interest.  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995); Allah 
v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000).  Rather,  a “liberty interest only exists if 
that placement is an ‘atypical and significant hardship’ relative to others similarly 
sentenced.”  Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 546 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Sandin, 515 
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U.S. at 484).  We have previously held that seven months in disciplinary confinement did 
not implicate a liberty interest.  Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 645, 654 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Similarly, disciplinary detention for fifteen days and administrative segregation 
for 120 days did not implicate a protected liberty interest.  Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 
141, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2002); cf. Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding 
that eight years in administrative custody is atypical and implicates a protected liberty 
interest).  Here, Abdul-Aziz complained of a due process violation based on nine days in 
TCC.  The conditions he complained of reflect typical restrictions in administrative 
custody.  We conclude that the duration and conditions of Abdul-Aziz’s segregation 
cannot be deemed atypical.  Accordingly, he does not have a protected liberty interest and 
was not entitled to procedural due process protection.   
Similarly, we agree with the District Court that Abdul-Aziz did not have a 
protected liberty interest in the institutional job he lost, and that he accordingly failed to 
state a viable Fourteenth Amendment claim arising from that occurrence.  Inmates do not 
have a liberty or property interest in their job assignments that would give rise to Due 
Process Clause protection.  James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 629-630 (3d Cir. 1989).   
III. 
The remainder of Abdul-Aziz’s claims were terminated pursuant to the 
defendants’ motions for summary judgment.  We review the District Court’s orders 
granting summary judgment de novo and review the facts in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party.  Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011).  A 
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grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals that “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
Abdul-Aziz claimed that his right to practice his religion was infringed upon by 
NJSP’s refusal to accept donated Halal meats for use in the inmates’ meals, by providing 
“vegetarian” meals that were not actually vegetarian, and by prohibiting inmates from 
possessing prayer oil in their cells.  He alleged that Jewish inmates were provided Kosher 
meals for Passover, and Muslim inmates were therefore denied equal protection of the 
law.  He claimed that these policies and practices violated his rights pursuant to the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.   
“Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its 
directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.”  O’Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citation omitted).  However, an inmate only “retains 
those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or 
with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”   Pell v. Procunier, 
417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).  To determine whether a regulation infringing upon 
constitutional rights is reasonable, courts apply the four factors set forth in Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  These factors require courts to consider: (1) whether the 
regulation bears a ‘valid, rational connection’ to a legitimate and neutral government 
objective; (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain 
open to prison inmates;” (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional 
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right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources 
generally;” and (4) “the absence of ready alternatives.”  Id. at 89-90; see also Fraise v. 
Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 513-14 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).   
With regard to Abdul-Aziz’s Equal Protection claim, “Turner is equally applicable 
[], and the appropriate analysis for this claim is the same as that for [his] Free Exercise 
claim.”  DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 61 (3d Cir. 2000).  Generally, prison officials 
cannot discriminate against inmates of different religions.  Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 
(1972) (per curiam).  However, an inmate “cannot obtain relief if the difference between 
the defendants’ treatment of him and their treatment of [inmates of another religion] is 
‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”  DeHart, 227 F.3d at 61. 
 We agree with the District Court that no genuine issue of material fact 
existed in Abdul-Aziz’s claim that NJSP’s policy regarding Halal meats placed a 
burden on his religious exercise.  Abdul-Aziz claimed that there were donations of 
Halal meat available for Muslim feast days that the prison refused to accept, but 
nothing in the record suggests that the consumption of meat, Halal or otherwise, is 
required for Abdul-Aziz to practice his religion.  In his deposition, Abdul-Aziz 
describes Halal food as “pork-free, wine-free, [and] slaughtered properly . . . . 
every day this would be your diet.”  Dkt. No. 43-6, at 59.  Vegetarian meals satisfy 
these requirements.  Review of the record indicates that NJSP cannot accept 
donated meals unless such food is determined to be necessary for the observance 
of a holy day.  Id. at 9.  Abdul-Aziz has presented evidence establishing only that 
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any meat eaten by Muslims must be Halal, not that Halal meats must be eaten on 
feast days.  Therefore his First Amendment rights were not violated, nor were his 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Jewish inmates received Kosher meals at Passover 
because they were determined to be necessary for religious observance.  Id.  
Because the vegetarian meals did not violate Islam’s proscription on non-Halal 
meat, while non-Kosher meals would not have met the religious requirements of 
Passover, reasonable penological interests were served by the differential 
treatment.   
 The District Court also correctly determined that no genuine issue of 
material fact existed with respect to Abdul-Aziz’s claim that the vegetarian meals 
served at NJSP actually contained meat.  Abdul-Aziz cited a transcript from a 
deposition taken in 2001 and a letter from Schreiber Foods stating that trace 
amount of certain enzymes could be present in School Choice American cheese.  
Dkt. No. 39-2, at 37-39.  Review of the record in this case indicates that the 
religious vegetarian meals at NJSP are not contaminated.  The DOC Regional 
Food Service Supervisor specified that the religious vegetarian meals at NJSP do 
not contain meat or American cheese.  He also indicated that the meals contain 
powder cheddar cheese that is not made with meat.  Dkt. No. 43-5, at 2.  As 
Abdul-Aziz offered no evidence contrary to this declaration, the grant of summary 
judgment was proper. 
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 The final aspect of Abdul-Aziz’s religious claim is that his religious 
exercise was impeded by NJSP’s policy forbidding the possession of oils in cells.  
NJSP forbids oils (including prayer oils) in cells for security reasons.  Dkt. No. 43-
3, at 3.  Imam Rasoul Suluki, who is permitted to bring such oil into the prison for 
prayer services, stated in his declaration that while prayer oil is a “custom or 
recommended practices,” it “is not part of the Islamic Fard, which is an obligatory 
or mandatory practice.”  Dkt. no. 43-4, at 2.  Review of the record did not produce 
any evidence suggesting that Abdul-Aziz’s ability to practice his faith was 
restricted or that he was prohibited from practicing his religion in any manner.  
The defendants were therefore entitled to an entry of summary judgment on this 
claim. 
 Summary judgment in favor of the defendants was also proper as to Abdul-Aziz’s 
claim of that the defendants retaliated against him by placing him in TCC and reassigning 
him to a lower-paying institutional job.  Retaliating against a prisoner for the exercise of 
his constitutional rights is unconstitutional.  See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333–34 
(3d Cir. 2001).  A plaintiff in a retaliation case must prove that: (1) he engaged in 
constitutionally protected conduct, (2) “he suffered some ‘adverse action’ at the hands of 
the prison officials”; and (3) “his constitutionally protected conduct was ‘a substantial or 
motivating factor’ in the decision” to take that action.  Id. at 333.  “Prison officials may 
still prevail by proving that they would have made the same decision absent the protected 
conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”   Id. at 334. 
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 Abdul-Aziz filed grievances regarding various matters from March until August 
2008.  Dkt. No. 5, at 4-6.  On August 15, 2008, prison officials discovered memory cards 
rolled up in Muslim prayer rugs in a common area of the prison.  The memory cards were 
confiscated as contraband.  On August 18, 2008, Abdul-Aziz told prison officials that the 
memory cards belonged to him.  On August 19, 2008, Abdul-Aziz was transferred to 
TCC status.  Dkt. No. 43-1, at 29.  The defendants argued in their brief that “Plaintiff 
would have been placed in TCC, issued the same disciplinary charge, and treated in the 
same manner even in the absence of his filing grievances and/or complaints.”  Id. at 28.  
This statement, along with the chronology following the memory cards’ discovery, 
established a legitimate penological purpose for TCC status, thus precluding the existence 
of a genuine issue of material fact and entitling the defendants summary judgment on this 
claim.   
 Likewise, nothing in the record indicates that Abdul-Aziz’s reassignment to a 
lower-paying institutional job was the result of retaliation, as it was also done for a 
legitimate penological purpose.  Abdul-Aziz was working as a Forms Room file clerk on 
January 29, 2009, when an NJSP official observed speakers connected to Abdul-Aziz’s 
workstation computer.  Music files were stored on the computer, and Abdul-Aziz had 
listened them on at least one occasion.  Dkt. No. 82-1, at ¶¶ 32-33.  Inmates are not 
permitted to download music or games on the computers.  As a result, Abdul-Aziz was 
charged with a disciplinary infraction for misuse of electronic equipment, but it was 
dismissed because he was not served with the charge within the applicable time limit.  Id. 
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at ¶ 50.  However, following the disposition of any infraction, all inmates must go before 
the Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”), which may look at the conduct 
underlying the charge regardless of its outcome.  Id. at ¶¶ 40-41.  The ICC has the 
discretion to reassign an inmate to a different job if it determines that the safety and 
security of the facility will be threatened by returning the inmate to the inmate’s former 
work assignment.  Id. at ¶ 43.  Abdul-Aziz met with the ICC on February 11, 2009, and 
he was subsequently reassigned from Forms Room clerk to cell sanitation.  Id. at ¶ 19.  
This reassignment took place nearly three months after he filed a lawsuit and nearly five 
months after he filed his last complaint.  Abdul-Aziz admitted all of the facts mentioned 
above in his counter-statement of facts (Dkt. No. 84-2), and therefore there is no genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether his reassignment served a legitimate penological 
interest.  Summary judgment in favor of defendants was therefore appropriate regarding 
this claim as well.   
IV. 
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 To the extent Abdul-Aziz requests appointment of counsel in his argument in support of 
the appeal, that request is denied. 
